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Abstract 
A key goal of computational neuroscience is to link brain mechanisms to behavioral functions. 
The present article describes recent progress towards explaining how laminar neocortical circuits 
give rise to biological intelligence. These circuits embody two new and revolutionary 
computational paradigms: Complementary Computing and Laminar Computing. Circuit 
properties include a novel synthesis of feedforward and feedback processing, of digital and 
analog processing, and of pre-attentive and attentive processing. This synthesis clarifies the 
appeal of Bayesian approaches but has a far greater predictive range that naturally extends to 
self-organizing processes. Examples from vision and cognition are summarized. A LAMINART 
architecture unifies properties of visual development, learning, perceptual grouping, attention, 
and 3D vision. A key modeling theme is that the mechanisms which enable development and 
learning to occur in a stable way imply properties of adult behavior. It is noted how higher-order 
attentional constraints can influence multiple cortical regions, and how spatial and object 
attention work together to learn view-invariant object categories. In particular, a form-fitting 
spatial attentional shroud can allow an emerging view-invariant object category to remain active 
while multiple view categories are associated with it during sequences of saccadic eye 
movements. Finally, the chapter summarizes recent work on the LIST PARSE model of 
cognitive information processing by the laminar circuits of prefrontal cortex. LIST PARSE 
models the short-term storage of event sequences in working memory, their unitization through 
learning into sequence, or list, chunks, and their read-out in planned sequential performance that 
is under volitional control. LIST PARSE provides a laminar embodiment of Item and Order 
working memories, also called Competitive Queuing models, that have been supported by both 
psychophysical and neurobiological data. These examples show how variations of a common 
laminar cortical design can embody properties of visual and cognitive intelligence that seem, at 
least on the surface, to be mechanistically unrelated. 
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Introduction 
Although there has been enormous experimental and theoretical progress on understanding brain 
or mind in the fields of neuroscience and psychology, establishing a mechanistic link between 
them has been very difficult, if only because these two levels of description often seem to be so 
different. Yet establishing a link between brain and mind is crucial in any mature theory of how a 
brain or mind works. Without such a link, the mechanisms of the brain have no functional 
significance, and the functions of behavior have no mechanistic explanation. Throughout the 
history of psychology and neuroscience, some researchers have tried to establish such a link by 
the use of metaphors or the application of classical concepts to the brain. These have included 
hydraulic systems, digital computers, holograms, control theory circuits, and Bayesian networks, 
to name a few. None of these approaches have managed to explicate the unique design principles 
and mechanisms that characterize biological intelligence. The present chapter summarizes 
aspects of a rapidly developing theory of neocortex that links explanations of behavioral 
functions to underlying biophysical, neurophysiological, and anatomical mechanisms. Progress 
has been particularly rapid towards understanding how the laminar circuits of visual cortex see 
(Cao and Grossberg, 2005; Grossberg, 1999a, 2003a; Grossberg and Hong, 2006; Grossberg and 
Howe, 2003; Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 1997; Grossberg and Raizada, 2000; Grossberg and 
Seitz, 2003; Grossberg and Swaminathan, 2004; Grossberg and Yazdanbakhsh, 2005; Raizada 
and Grossberg, 2001, 2003; Yazdanbakhsh and Grossberg, 2004).  
This progress illustrates the introduction of qualitatively new computational paradigms, 
as might have been expected, given how long these problems have remained unsolved. These 
results overcome a conceptual impasse that is illustrated by the popular proposal that our brains 
possess independent modules, as in a digital computer. The brain’s organization into distinct 
anatomical areas and processing streams supports the idea that brain processing is specialized, 
but that, in itself, does not imply that these streams contain independent modules. This 
hypothesis gained dominance despite the fact that much behavioral data argue against 
independent modules. For example, during visual perception, strong interactions are known to 
occur between perceptual qualities (Egusa, 1983; Faubert and von Grunau, 1995; Kanizsa, 1974; 
Pessoa, Beck, and Mingolla, 1996; Smallman and McKee, 1995). In particular, form and motion 
can interact, as can brightness and depth, among other combinations of qualities.  
Complementary Computing and Laminar Computing 
At least two new computational paradigms have gradually been identified from the cumulative 
experiences of modeling many kinds of brain and behavior data over the past three decades: 
Complementary Computing and Laminar Computing (Grossberg, 1999a, 2000). Complementary 
Computing concerns the discovery that pairs of parallel cortical processing streams compute 
complementary properties in the brain. Each stream has complementary computational strengths 
and weaknesses, much as in physical principles like the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Each 
cortical stream can also possess multiple processing stages. These stages realize a hierarchical 
resolution of uncertainty. “Uncertainty” here means that computing one set of properties at a 
given stage can suppress information about a complementary set of properties at that stage. The 
computational unit of brain processing that has behavioral significance is thus not a single 
processing stage, or any smaller entity such as the potential of a single cell or of a spike or burst 
of spikes. Instead, hierarchical interactions within a stream and parallel interactions between 
streams resolve their complementary deficiencies to compute complete information about a 
particular type of biological intelligence. These interactions have been used to clarify many of 
the data that do not support the hypothesis of independent modules. To model how the brain 
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controls behavior, one thus needs to know how these complementary streams are organized with 
respect to one another.  
Figure 1 
Understanding how the brain sees is one area where experimental and modeling work have 
advanced the furthest, and illustrate several types of complementary interactions. Figure 1 
provides a schematic macrocircuit of the types of processes that are being assembled into a 
unified theory of how the brain sees, including processes of vision, recognition, navigation, 
tracking, and visual cognition. In particular, matching and learning processes within the What 
and Where cortical streams have been proposed to be complementary: The What stream, through 
cortical areas V1-V2-V4-IT-PFC, learns to recognize what objects and events occur. The Where 
stream, through cortical areas V1-MT-MST-PPC-PFC, spatially localizes where they are, and 
acts upon them. Complementary processes also occur within each stream: What stream boundary 
grouping via the (V1 interblob)-(V2 pale stripe)-V4 stages, and surface formation via the (V1 
blob)-(V2 thin stripe)-V4 stages, have complementary properties. Where stream target tracking 
via MT-(MST ventral) and navigation via MT-(MST dorsal) have complementary properties. 
Such complementary processes are predicted to arise from symmetry-breaking operations during 
cortical development. 
Laminar Computing concerns the fact that cerebral cortex is organized into layered 
circuits (usually six main layers) which undergo characteristic bottom-up, top-down, and 
horizontal interactions, which have been classified into more than fifty divisions, or areas, of 
neocortex (Brodmann, 1909; Martin, 1989). The functional utility of such a laminar organization 
in the control of behavior has remained a mystery until recently. Understanding how different 
parts of the neocortex specialize the same underlying laminar circuit design in order to achieve 
all the highest form of biological intelligence remains a long-term goal, although challenging 
data about both vision and cognitive information processing (Grossberg and Pearson, 2006; 
Pearson and Grossberg, 2005) have now been modeled as variations of this design.  
Laminar Computing by Visual Cortex:  
Unifying Adaptive Filtering, Grouping, and Attention 
A number of models have been proposed (Douglas et al., 1995; Li, 1998; Stemmler et al., 1995; 
Somers et al., 1998; Yen and Finkel, 1998) to simulate aspects of visual cortical dynamics, but 
these models have not articulated why cortex has a laminar architecture. Our own group’s 
breakthrough on this problem (Grossberg, 1999a; Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 1997) began 
with the suggestion that the laminar organization of visual cortex accomplishes at least three 
things: (1) the developmental and learning processes whereby the cortex shapes its circuits to 
match environmental constraints in a stable way through time; (2) the binding process whereby 
cortex groups distributed data into coherent object representations that remain sensitive to analog 
properties of the environment; and (3) the attentional process whereby cortex selectively 
processes important events.  
These results further develop the proposal that even the earliest stages of visual cortex are 
not merely a bottom-up filtering device, as in the classical model of Hubel and Wiesel (1977). 
Instead, bottom-up filtering, horizontal grouping, and top-down attention are all joined together 
in laminar cortical circuits. Perceptual grouping, the process that binds spatially distributed and 
incomplete information into 3D object representations, starts at an early cortical stage; see Figure 
2c. These grouping interactions are often cited as the basis of “non-classical” receptive fields that 
are sensitive to the context in which individual features are found (Bosking et al., 1997; Grosof, 
Shapley, and Hawken, 1993; Kapadia, Ito, Gilbert, and Westheimer, 1995; Knierim and van 
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Essen, 1992; Peterhans and von der Heydt, 1989; Polat et al., 1998; Sheth et al., 1996; von der 
Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner, 1984; Sillito, Grieve et al., 1995). Likewise, even early 
visual processing is modulated by system goals via top-down expectations and attention (Motter, 
1993; Roelfsema, Lamme, and Spekreijse, 1998; Sillito et al., 1994; Somers et al., 1999; 
Watanabe et al., 1998). The model proposes how mechanisms governing (1) in the infant lead to 
properties (2) and (3) in the adult, and properties (2) and (3) interact together intimately as a 
result.  
The laminar model proposes that there is no strict separation of pre-attentive data-driven 
bottom-up filtering and grouping, from attentive task-directed top-down processes. The model 
shows how these processes may come together at a shared circuit, or interface, that is called the 
preattentive-attentive interface, which exists between layers 6 and 4 (Figures 2a–2c, and 2e). 
Significantly, by indicating how cortical mechanisms of stable development and learning impose 
key properties of adult visual information processing, the model begins to unify the fields of 
cortical development and adult vision. The model is called a LAMINART model (Figure 2; 
Grossberg, 1999a, Raizada and Grossberg, 2003) because it clarifies how mechanisms of 
Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, which have previously been predicted to stabilize cortical 
development and learning of bottom-up adaptive filters and top-down attentive expectations 
(Carpenter and Grossberg, 1993; Grossberg, 1980, 1999c) can be joined together in laminar 
circuits to processes of perceptual grouping through long-range horizontal interactions 
(Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985b). 
Figure 2  
A New Way to Compute:  
Feedforward and Feedback, Speed and Uncertainty, Digital and Analog  
The LAMINART model proposes how laminar neocortex embodies a novel way to compute 
which exhibits at least three major new computational properties (Grossberg, 2003a). These new 
properties allow the fast, but stable, autonomous self-organization that is characteristic of cortical 
development and life-long learning in response to changing and uncertain environments. They go 
beyond the types of Bayesian cortical models that are so popular today, but also clarify the 
intuitive appeal of these models (Pilly and Grossberg, 2005). 
The first property concerns a new type of hybrid between feedforward and feedback 
computing. In particular, when an unambiguous scene is processed, the LAMINART model can 
quickly group the scene in a fast feedforward sweep of activation that passes directly through 
layer 4 to 2/3 and then on to layers 4 to 2/3 in subsequent cortical areas. This property clarifies 
how recognition can be fast in response to unambiguous scenes; e.g., Thorpe et al. (1996). If, 
however, there are multiple possible groupings, say in response to a complex textured scene, 
then competition among these possibilities due to inhibitory interactions in layers 4 and 2/3 can 
cause all cell activities to become smaller. This happens because the competitive circuits in the 
model are self-normalizing; that is, they tend to conserve the total activity of the circuit. This 
self-normalizing property emerges from shunting on-center off-surround networks that process 
input contrasts over a large dynamic range without saturation (Douglas et al., 1995; Grossberg, 
1973, 1980; Heeger, 1992). 
In other words, these self-normalizing circuits carry out a type of real-time probability 
theory in which the amplitude (and coherence) of cell activity covaries with the certainty of the 
network’s selection, or decision, about a grouping. Amplitude also covaries with processing 
speed. Low activation greatly slows down the feedforward processing in the circuit because it 
takes longer for cell activities to exceed output thresholds and to activate subsequent cells above 
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threshold. 
In the model, network uncertainty is resolved through feedback: Weakly active layer 2/3 
grouping cells feed back signals to layers 6-then-4-then-2/3 to close a cortical feedback loop that 
rapidly contrast enhances and amplifies a winning grouping. As the winner is selected, and 
weaker groupings are suppressed, its cells become more active, hence can again more rapidly 
exceed output thresholds and send the cortical decision to subsequent processing stages. In 
summary, the LAMINART circuit behaves like a real-time probabilistic decision circuit that 
operates in a fast feedforward mode when there is little uncertainty, and automatically switches 
to a slower feedback mode when there is significant uncertainty. Feedback selects a winning 
decision that enables the circuit to speed up again. Activation amplitude and processing speed 
both increase with certainty. The large activation amplitude of a winning grouping is facilitated 
by the synchronization that occurs as the winning grouping is selected. 
The second property concerns a novel kind of hybrid computing that simultaneously 
realizes the stability of digital computing and the sensitivity of analog computing. This is true 
because the intracortical feedback loop between layers 2/3-6-4-2/3 that selects or confirms a 
winning grouping has the property of analog coherence (Grossberg, 1999a; Grossberg, Mingolla, 
and Ross, 1997; Grossberg and Raizada, 2000); namely, this feedback loop can synchronously 
store a winning grouping without losing analog sensitivity to amplitude differences in the input 
pattern. The coherence of synchronous selection and storage provides the stability of digital 
computing. The sensitivity of analog computation can be traced to how excitatory and inhibitory 
interactions are balanced within layers 4 and 2/3, and to the shunting dynamics of the inhibitory 
interactions within these layers. 
The third property concerns its ability to self-stabilize development and learning using 
the intracortical feedback loop between layers 2/3-6-4-2/3 by selecting cells that fire together to 
wire together. As further discussed below, this intracortical decision circuit is predicted to help 
stabilize development in the infant and learning throughout life, as well as to select winning 
groupings in the adult (Grossberg, 1999a).  
The critical role of the layer 6-to-4 decision circuit in the realization of all three 
properties clarifies that they are all different expressions of a shared circuit design. 
Linking Stable Development to Synchrony 
 The LAMINART model clarifies how excitatory and inhibitory connections in the cortex can 
develop in a stable way by achieving and maintaining a balance between excitation and 
inhibition (Grossberg and Williamson, 2001). Long-range excitatory horizontal connections 
between pyramidal cells in layer 2/3 of visual cortical areas play an important role in perceptual 
grouping (Hirsch and Gilbert, 1991; McGuire et al., 1991). The LAMINART model proposes 
how development enables the strength of long-range excitatory horizontal signals to become 
balanced against that of inhibitory signals that are mediated by short-range di-synaptic inhibitory 
interneurons that target the same target pyramidal cells (Figure 1c). These balanced connections 
are proposed to realize properties of perceptual grouping in the adult. In a similar way, 
development enables the strength of excitatory connections from layer 6-to-4 to be balanced 
against those of inhibitory interneuronal connections (Wittmer, Dalva, and Katz, 1997); see 
Figures 2a and 2c. Thus the net excitatory effect of layer 6 on layer 4 is proposed to be 
modulatory. These approximately balanced excitatory and inhibitory connections exist within the 
on-center of a modulatory on-center, off-surround network from layer 6-to-4. This network plays 
at least three functional roles that are intimately linked: maintaining a contrast-normalized 
response to bottom-up inputs at layer 4 (Figure 2a); forming perceptual groupings in layer 2/3 
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that maintain their sensitivity to analog properties of the world (Figure 2c); and biasing 
groupings via top-down attention from higher cortical areas (Figure 2b; also see Figures 2d and 
2e). 
Balanced excitatory and inhibitory connections have been proposed by several models to 
explain the observed variability in the number and temporal distribution of spikes emitted by 
cortical neurons (Shadlen and Newsome, 1998; van Vreeswijk and Sompolinsky, 1998). The 
LAMINART model proposes that such variability may reflect mechanisms that are needed to 
ensure stable development and learning. If indeed “stability implies variability,” how does the 
cortex convert these variable spikes, which are inefficient in driving responses from cortical 
neurons, into reliable responses to visual inputs? Within LAMINART circuits, such balanced 
excitatory and inhibitory connections respond to inputs by rapidly synchronizing their responses 
to input stimuli (Yazdanbakhsh and Grossberg, 2004; see also Grossberg and Grunewald, 1997; 
Grossberg and Somers, 1991). In fact, the article that introduced ART predicted a role for 
synchronous cortical processing, including synchronous oscillations, which were there called 
“order-preserving limit cycles”, as part of the process of establishing resonant states (Grossberg, 
1976). Since the experimental reports of Eckhorn et al. (1988) and Gray and Singer (1989), 
many neurophysiological experiments have reported synchronous cortical processing. The ART 
model further predicted a functional link between properties of stable development, adult 
perceptual learning, attention, and synchronous cortical processing, to which the LAMINART 
model adds perceptual grouping in laminar cortical circuits.  
Attention Arises from Top-Down Cooperative-Competitive Matching 
Attention typically modulates an ongoing process. In order for the concept of attention to be 
scientifically useful, these processes need to be articulated and the way in which attention 
modulates them needs to be mechanistically explained. LAMINART, and ART before it, 
predicted that an intimate link exists between processes of attention, competition, and bottom-
up/top-down matching. LAMINART predicts, in particular, that top-town signals from higher 
cortical areas, such as area V2, can attentionally prime, or modulate, layer 4 cells in area V1 by 
activating the on-center off-surround network from layer 6-to-4 (Figures 2b and 2e). Because the 
excitatory and inhibitory signals in the on-center are balanced, attention can sensitize, or 
modulate, cells in the attentional on-center, without fully activating them, while also inhibiting 
cells in the off-surround.  
Figure 3 
The importance of the conclusion that top-down attention is often expressed through a top-down, 
modulatory on-center, off-surround network cannot be overstated. Because of this organization, 
top-down attention can typically provide only excitatory modulation to cells in the on-center, 
while it can strongly inhibit cells in the off-surround. As Hupé et al. (1997, p. 1031) have noted: 
“feedback connections from area V2 modulate but do not create center-surround interactions in 
V1 neurons.” When the top-down on-center matches bottom-up signals, it can amplify and 
synchronize them, while strongly suppressing mismatched signals in the off-surround. This 
prediction was first made as part of ART in the 1970’s (Grossberg, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1999a, 
1999c). It has since received both of psychological and neurobiological empirical confirmation 
in the visual system (Bullier et al., 1996; Caputo and Guerra, 1998; Downing, 1988; Mounts, 
2000; Reynolds, Chelazzi, and Desimone, 1999; Smith, Singh, and Greenlee, 2000; Somers et 
al., 1999; Sillito et al., 1994; Steinman, Steinman, and Lehmkuhle, 1995; Vanduffell, Tootell, 
and Orban, 2000). Based on such data, this property has recently been restated, albeit without a 
precise anatomical realization, in terms of the concept of “biased competition” (Desimone, 1998; 
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Kastner and Ungerleider, 2001), in which attention biases the competitive influences within the 
network. Figure 3 summarizes data of Reynolds, Chelazzi, and Desimone (1999) and a 
simulation of these data from Grossberg and Raizada (2000) that illustrate the on-center off-
surround character of attention in macaque V2. 
The Preattentive-Attentive Interface and Object-Based Attention 
Top-down attention and pre-attentive perceptual grouping interact within the cortical layers to 
enable attention to focus on an entire object boundary, thereby enabling whole object boundaries 
to be selectively attended and recognized. This happens because the same layer 6-to-4 
competition, or selection, circuit may be activated both by pre-attentive grouping cells in layer 
2/3, and by top-down attentional pathways (Figures 2b and 2c). Layer 4 cells can then, in turn, 
reactivate layer 2/3 cells (Figure 2c). This layer 6-to-4 circuit “folds” the feedback from top-
down attention or a layer 2/3 grouping back into the feedforward flow of bottom-up inputs to 
layer 4. It is thus said to embody a “folded feedback” process (Grossberg, 1999a). Thus, when 
ambiguous complex scenes are being processed, intracortical folded feedback enables stronger 
groupings in layer 2/3 to inhibit weaker groupings, whereas intercortical folded feedback 
enables higher-order attentive constraints to bias which groupings will be selected. 
Figure 2e summarizes the hypothesis that top-down attentional signals to layer 1 may 
also directly modulate groupings via apical dendrites of both excitatory and inhibitory layer 2/3 
cells in layer 1 (Lund and Wu, 1997; Rockland, and Virga, 1989). By activating both excitatory 
and inhibitory cells in layer 2/3, the inhibitory cells may balance the excitatory cell activation, 
thereby enabling attention to directly modulate grouping cells in layer 2/3.  
Figure 4 
Because the cortex uses the same circuits to select groupings and to prime attention, attention can 
flow along perceptual groupings, as reported by Roelfsema, Lamme, and Spekreijse (1998). In 
particular, when attention causes an excitatory modulatory bias at some cells in layer 4, 
groupings that form in layer 2/3 can be enhanced by this modulation via their positive feedback 
loops from 2/3-to-6-to-4-to-2/3. The direct modulation of layer 2/3 by attention can also enhance 
these groupings. Figure 4 summarizes a LAMINART simulation of data from Roelfsema et al. 
(1998) of the spread of visual attention along an object boundary grouping. LAMINART has 
also been used to simulate the flow of attention along an illusory contour (Raizada and 
Grossberg, 2001), consistent with experimental data of Moore, Yantis, and Vaughan (1998). The 
ability of attention to selectively light up entire object representations has an obviously important 
survival value in adults. It is thus of particular interest that the intracortical and intercortical 
feedback circuits that control this property have been shown in modeling studies to play a key 
role in stabilizing infant development and adult perceptual learning within multiple cortical 
areas, including cortical areas V1 and V2. 
Stable Development and Learning through Adaptive Resonance 
Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART (Engel, Fries, and Singer, 2001; Grossberg, 1980, 1995, 
1999c; Pollen, 1999) is a cognitive and neural theory which addresses a general problem that 
faces all adaptive brain processes; namely, the stability-plasticity dilemma: how can brain 
circuits be plastic enough to be rapidly fine-tuned by new experiences, and yet simultaneously 
stable enough that they do not get catastrophically overwritten by the new stimuli with which 
they are continually bombarded? 
The solution that ART proposes to this problem is to allow neural representations to be 
rapidly modified only by those incoming stimuli with which they form a sufficiently close 
match. If the match is close enough, then learning occurs. Because an approximate match is 
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required, such learning fine-tunes the memories of existing representations, so that outliers 
cannot radically overwrite an already learned representation. ART proposes how a learning 
individual can flexibly vary the criterion, called vigilance, of how good a match is needed 
between bottom-up and top-down information in order for the presently active representation to 
be refined through learning. When coarse matches are allowed (low vigilance), the learned 
representations can represent general and abstract information. When only fine matches are 
allowed (high vigilance), the representations are more specific and concrete. If the active neural 
representation does not match with the incoming stimulus, then its neural activity is extinguished 
and hence unable to cause plastic changes.  
Suppression of an active representation enables mismatch-mediated memory search, or 
hypothesis-testing, to ensue whereby some other representation can become active through 
bottom-up signaling. This representation, in turn, reads out top-down signals that either gives rise 
to a match, thereby allowing learning, or a non-match, causing the search process to repeat until 
either a match is found or the incoming stimulus causes a totally new representation to be 
formed. For this to work, top-down expectations initially have large enough adaptive memory 
traces to enable a match to occur with a newly selected representation. It has been suggested that 
breakdowns in vigilance control can contribute to various disorders, including medial temporal 
amnesia (abnormally low vigilance; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1993) and autism (abnormally 
high vigilance; Grossberg and Seidman, 2006). 
In both ART and its elaboration into LAMINART, attention is mediated by a top-down, 
modulatory on-center, off-surround network (e.g., Grossberg, 1980, 1982, 1999b), whose role is 
to select and enhance behaviorally relevant bottom-up sensory inputs (match), and suppress 
those that are irrelevant (non-match). Mutual excitation between the top-down feedback and the 
bottom-up signals that they match can amplify, synchronize, and maintain existing neural 
activity in a resonant state long enough for rapid synaptic changes to occur. Thus, attentionally 
relevant stimuli are learned, while irrelevant stimuli are suppressed and prevented from 
destabilizing existing representations. Hence the name adaptive resonance. Grossberg (1999c, 
2003a) provide more detailed reviews. 
The folded feedback layer 6-to-4 modulatory on-center, off-surround attentional pathway 
in the LAMINART model (Figure 2b) satisfies the predicted properties of ART matching. The 
claim that bottom-up sensory activity is enhanced when matched by top-down signals is in 
accord with an extensive neurophysiological literature showing the facilitatory effect of 
attentional feedback (Luck et al., 1997; Roelfsema et al., 1998; Sillito et al., 1994), but not with 
models in which matches with top-down feedback cause suppression (Mumford, 1992; Rao and 
Ballard, 1999). The ART proposal raises two key questions: First, does top-down cortical 
feedback have the predicted top-down, modulatory on-center, off-surround structure in other 
neocortical structures, where again the stabilizing role of top-down feedback in learning would 
be required? Second, is there evidence that top-down feedback controls plasticity in the area to 
which it is directed? 
Zhang, Suga, and Yan (1997) have shown that feedback from auditory cortex to the 
medial geniculate nucleus (MGN) and the inferior colliculus (IC) also has an on-center off-
surround form, and Temereanca and Simons (2001) have produced evidence for a similar 
feedback architecture in the rodent barrel somatosensory system. 
The Link between Attention and Learning 
Accumulating evidence also shows that top-down feedback helps to control cortical plasticity. 
Psychophysically, the role of attention in controlling adult plasticity and perceptual learning was 
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demonstrated by Ahissar and Hochstein (1993). Gao and Suga (1998) reported physiological 
evidence that acoustic stimuli caused plastic changes in the inferior colliculus (IC) of bats only 
when the IC received top-down feedback from auditory cortex. Plasticity is enhanced when the 
auditory stimuli were made behaviorally relevant, consistent with the ART proposal that top-
down feedback allows attended, and thus relevant, stimuli to be learned, while suppressing 
unattended irrelevant ones. Cortical feedback also controls thalamic plasticity in the 
somatosensory system (Krupa, Ghazanfar, and Nicolelis, 1999; Parker and Dostrovsky, 1999). 
See Kaas (1999) for a review.  
Models of intracortical feedback due to grouping, and of intercortical feedback due to 
attention, have shown that either type of feedback can rapidly synchronize the firing patterns of 
higher and lower cortical areas (Grossberg and Grunewald, 1997; Grossberg and Somers, 1991; 
Yazdanbakhsh and Grossberg, 2004). ART predicts that such synchronization phenomena under 
lie the type of resonances that can trigger cortical learning by enhancing the probability that 
“cells that fire together wire together.” Engel, Fries, and Singer (2001) review data and related 
models that are consistent with the proposal that synchrony, attention, and learning are related. 
View-Invariant Object Category Learning: 
Coordinating Object Attention and Surface-based Spatial Attention Shrouds 
The above summary has focused on object attention. It did not discuss spatial attention, how 
spatial and object attention work together, or how attention is hierarchically organized. The 
above summary also talks about category learning, but not the fact that view-invariant object 
categories may be learned from combinations of multiple object views. The present section 
sketches some results concerning these more global issues about brain organization. 
 One way in which attention may globally influence many brain regions is illustrated in 
Figure 2e, which shows how attention can leap from higher cortical levels to multiple lower 
cortical areas via their layers 6. This anatomy proposes a solution to an otherwise challenging 
problem: How can attention prime so many cortical areas with higher-order constraints without 
inadvertently firing them all? Figure 2e shows that attention can leap between the layers 6 of 
different cortical areas without firing them all, because the layer 6-to-4 circuits that act 
intracortically are modulatory. 
The above example illustrates how attention can act “vertically” between cortical regions. 
Many studies have analyzed how attention is spread “horizontally” across a given level of 
cortical processing, including how spatial attention may be simultaneously divided among 
several targets (Pylyshyn and Storm, 1988; Yantis, 1992), and how object and spatial attention 
may both influence visual perception (Duncan, 1984; Posner, 1980). The distinction between 
object and spatial attention reflects the organization of visual cortex into parallel What and 
Where processing streams (Figure 1). Many cognitive neuroscience experiments have supported 
the hypotheses of Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982; see also Mishkin, Ungerleider, and Macko 
(1983)) and of Goodale and Milner (1992) that inferotemporal cortex and its cortical projections 
learn to categorize and recognize what objects are in the world, whereas the parietal cortex and 
its cortical projections learn to determine where they are and how to deal with them by locating 
them in space, tracking them through time, and directing actions towards them. This design into 
parallel streams separates sensory and cognitive processing from spatial and motor processing.  
The What stream strives to generate object representations that are independent of their 
spatial coordinates, whereas the Where stream generates representations of object location and 
action. The streams must thus interact to act upon recognized objects. Indeed, both object and 
spatial attention are needed to search a scene for visual targets and distractors using saccadic eye 
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movements. Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross (1994) illustrated how object and spatial attention 
may interact by quantitatively fitting a large human psychophysical database about visual search 
with a model, called the Spatial Object Search (SOS) model, that proposes how 3D boundary 
groupings and surface representations interact with object attention and spatial attention to find 
targets amid distractors. This analysis proposed that surface properties may engage spatial 
attention, as when search is restricted to all occurrences of a color on a prescribed depth plane 
(Egeth, Virzi, and, Garbart, 1984; Nakayama and Silverman, 1986; Wolfe and Freedman-Hill, 
1992).  
More recent modeling work has advanced the theoretical analysis of how spatial and 
object attention interact with surface and boundary representations to support the learning of 
view-invariant object categories (Fazl, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 2005, 2006). This work 
advances the solution of the following problem: How does the brain learn a view-invariant 
representation of a complex object while scanning its various parts with active eye movements? 
How does the brain avoid the problem of erroneously classifying parts of different objects as 
belonging to a single object? The ARTSCAN model predicts how spatial and object attention 
work together as eye movements scan a scene to selectively fuse, through learning, multiple 
views of an object into a view-invariant object category. 
In particular, ARTSCAN predicts that spatial attention employs an attentional shroud 
that is derived from an object's surface representation (Tyler and Kontsevich, 1995). ARTSCAN 
modified the original Tyler and Kontsevich (1995) concept in which the shroud was introduced 
as an alternative to the perception of simultaneous transparency, with evidence that only one 
plane is seen at a time within the perceptual moment. It talked only about object perception. 
ARTSCAN proposes that the shroud also plays a fundamental role in regulating object learning.  
Such a shroud is proposed to persist within the Where Stream during active scanning of 
an object with attentional shifts and eye movements. This claim raises the basic question: How 
can the shroud persist during active scanning of an object, if the brain has not yet learned that 
there is an object there? ARTSCAN proposes how pre-attentively formed surface representations 
(e.g., in visual cortical area V4) lead to activation of the shroud, even before the brain can 
identify the surface as representing a particular object. The surface representation, in turn, 
activates a shroud in a spatial attention cortical area (e.g., posterior parietal cortex), which in turn 
topographically primes the surface representation via top-down feedback. In addition, a 
volitionally-controlled, local focus of spatial attention can send a top-down attentional signal to a 
surface representation, which it fills-in within the surface boundary (Grossberg and Mingolla, 
1985b), much as a higher contrast would (Reynolds and Desimone, 2003), and then reactivates 
the spatial attention region to define a form-fitting spatial locus of spatial attention; that is, a 
shroud. Thus, a shroud can form through a surface/(spatial attention) resonance. 
The shroud modulates object learning in the What Stream by maintaining activity of an 
emerging view-invariant category representation while multiple view-specific representations are 
linked to it through learning as saccadic eye movements explore its surface. Any surface in a 
scene can potentially sustain an attentional shroud, and surface representations dynamically 
compete for spatial attention. The winner of the competition at a given moment gains more 
activity and becomes the shroud.  
The model postulates that an active shroud weakens through time due to self-inhibitory 
inputs at selected target locations (“inhibition of return”; Grossberg, 1978; Koch and Ullman, 
1985) combined with chemical transmitters that habituate, or are depressed, in an activity-
dependent way (Abbott et al., 1997; Francis, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 1994; Grossberg, 1968, 
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1969) and gate the signals that sustain the shroud. When an active shroud is weakened enough, it 
collapses and cannot any longer inhibit a tonically active reset signal. When a reset signal is 
disinhibited, it inhibits the active view-invariant object category in the What Stream, thereby 
preventing it from erroneously being linked to the view categories of different objects. Then a 
new shroud, corresponding to some other surface, is selected in the Where Stream, as a new 
object category is activated in the What Stream by the first view of the new object.  
While a shroud remains active, the usual ART mechanisms direct object attention to 
ensure that new view categories and the emerging view-invariant object category are learned in a 
stable way through time. ARTSCAN hereby provides a new proposal for how surface-based 
spatial attention and object attention are coordinated to learn view-invariant object categories. 
The ARTSCAN model learns with 98.1% accuracy on a letter database whose letters vary 
in size, position, and orientation. It does this while achieving a compression factor of 430 in the 
number of its category representations, compared to what would be required to learn the database 
without the view-invariant categories. The model also simulates reaction times (RTs) in human 
data about object-based attention: RTs are faster when responding to the non-cued end of an 
attended object compared to a location outside the object, and slower engagement of attention to 
a new object occurs if attention has to first be disengaged from another object first (Brown & 
Denney, in press). 
Learning without Attention: The Pre-Attentive Grouping is its Own Attentional Prime 
The fact that attentional feedback can influence cortical plasticity does not imply that unattended 
stimuli can never be learned. Indeed, abundant plasticity occurs during early development, 
before top-down attention has even come into being. Grossberg (1999a) noted that, were this not 
possible, an infinite regress could be created, since a lower cortical level like V1 might then not 
be able to stably develop unless it received attentional feedback from V2, but V2 itself could not 
develop unless it had received reliable bottom-up signals from V1. How does the cortex avoid 
this infinite regress so that, during development, plastic changes in cortex may be driven by 
stimuli that occur with high statistical regularity in the environment without causing massive 
instability, as modeled in the LAMINART simulations of Grossberg and Williamson (2001)? 
How does this process continue to fine-tune sensory representations in adulthood, even in cases 
where task-selective attention and awareness do not occur (Seitz and Watanabe, 2003; Watanabe, 
Nanez, and Sasaki, 2001)?  
The LAMINART model clarifies how attention is used to help stabilize learning, while 
also allowing learning to slowly occur without task-selective attention and awareness. It also 
links these properties to properties of pre-attentive vision that are not obviously related to them. 
For example, how can pre-attentive groupings, such as illusory contours, form over positions that 
receive no bottom-up inputs? Although we take such percepts for granted, illusory contours seem 
to contradict the ART matching rule, which says that bottom-up inputs are needed to fire cells, 
while top-down feedback is modulatory. How, then, can cells that represent the illusory contour 
fire at positions that do not receive bottom-up inputs without destabilizing cortical development 
and learning? If the brain had not solved this problem, anyone could roam through the streets of 
a city and destabilize the brains of pedestrians by showing them images of Kanizsa squares! The 
absurdity of this possibility indicates how fundamental the issue at hand really is. 
The LAMINART model proposes how the brain uses its laminar circuits to solve this 
problem using a preattentive-attentive interface in which both intercortical attentional feedback 
and intracortical grouping feedback share the same selection circuit from layer 6-to-4: When a 
grouping starts to form in layer 2/3, it activates the intracortical feedback pathway from layer 
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2/3-to-6, which activates the modulatory on-center, off-surround network from layer 6-to-4. This 
intracortical feedback pathway helps to select which cells will remain active in a winning 
grouping. Attention uses this same network to stabilize cortical development and learning 
through intercortical interactions. In other words, the intracortical layer 6-to-4 selection circuit, 
which in the adult helps to choose winning groupings, is also predicted to help stabilize visually-
induced brain development by assuring that the ART matching rule holds at every position along 
a grouping. Because the matching rule holds, only the correct combinations of cells can “fire 
together and wire together,” and hence stability is achieved. Intracortical feedback via layers 
2/3-to-6-to-4-to-2/3 realizes this selection process even before intercortical attentional feedback 
can develop. I like to say that: “The pre-attentive grouping is its own attentional prime” 
(Grossberg, 1999a).  
The LAMINART model hereby shows how, by joining together bottom-up (interlaminar) 
adaptive filtering, horizontal (intralaminar) grouping, top-down intracortical (but interlaminar) 
pre-attentive feedback, and top-down intercortical (and interlaminar) attentive feedback, some 
developmental and learning processes can be stabilized without top-down attention. This is 
realized by using intracortical feedback processes that activate the same stabilizing networks that 
top-down intercortical attentional processes use. Because of this intimate link between 
intracortical and intercortical feedback processes, attention can modulate the selection and 
activation level of pre-attentive grouping processes, as in the case of the Roelfsema et al. (1998) 
data.  
Balanced Excitatory and Inhibitory Circuits as a Cortical Design Principle 
The circuits that realize grouping and attentional processes compute balanced excitatory and 
inhibitory interactions. The excitatory/inhibitory balance within layer 2/3 circuits helps achieve 
perceptual grouping. The balance between excitatory and inhibitory interactions within the on-
center of the network from layer 6-to-4 helps to do several things, among them render top-down 
attention modulatory. Figure 2 shows only these two types of balanced excitatory and inhibitory 
circuits. Other cortical interactions also balance excitation and inhibition, including the 
interactions that realize monocular simple cell receptive fields in layer 4 (data: Liu et al., 1992; 
Palmer and Davis, 1981; Pollen and Ronner, 1981; model: Olson and Grossberg, 1998). 
Balanced excitatory/inhibitory interactions within layer 3B also give rise to binocular simple 
cells that initiate stereopsis by matching monocular inputs from different eyes (Cao and 
Grossberg, 2005; Grossberg and Howe, 2003). 
Figure 5 
The balanced interactions within layer 2/3, and those from layer 6-to-4, as in Figure 2, can 
explain data in which the excitatory/inhibitory balance is altered by sensory inputs. Figure 5 
summarizes data of Polat et al. (1998) on contrast-dependent perceptual grouping in primary 
visual cortex, and a model simulation of Grossberg and Raizada (2000). The excitatory effects 
that enable co-linear flankers to facilitate activation in response to a low-contrast target are 
mediated by layer 2/3 interactions, and the inhibitory effects that cause co-linear flankers to 
depress activation in response to a high-contrast target are mediated by the layer 6-to-4 off-
surround. These two types of effects propagate throughout the network via layer 4-to-2/3 and 
layer 2/3-to-6 interactions, among others. An important factor in the model simulation is that the 
inhibitory interactions are of shunting type (Douglas et al., 1995; Grossberg, 1973, 1980; 
Heeger, 1992) and thereby compute cell activations that are contrast-normalized. 
Figure 6 
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How can perceptual grouping data be explained as a manifestation of excitatory/inhibitory 
balance? In cortical area V2 of monkeys, approximately co-linear interactions from 
approximately co-oriented cells are capable of firing a cell that does not receive bottom-up inputs 
(von der Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner, 1984; Peterhans and von der Heydt, 1989), as 
occurs when an illusory contour is perceived. The von der Heydt, et al. (1984) experiment 
confirmed a prediction of Grossberg and colleagues (Cohen and Grossberg, 1984; Grossberg, 
1984; Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985a, 1985b) that perceptual grouping obeys a bipole property 
(Figure 6); namely, such a cell can fire if it gets approximately co-linear horizontal inputs from 
approximately co-oriented cells on both sides of its receptive field, even if it does not receive 
bottom-up input; or it can fire in response to bottom-up input alone, or to bottom-up input plus 
any combination of horizontal signals. The predicted bipole receptive field structure has been 
supported by later psychophysical experiments; e.g., Field, Hayes, and Hess (1993) and Kellman 
and Shipley (1991), and anatomical experiments; e.g., Bosking et al. (1997). The LAMINART 
model (Grossberg, 1999a; Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 1997) extended this analysis by 
predicting how the bipole property may be realized by balanced excitatory/inhibitory interactions 
within layer 2/3, as summarized in Figure 6. Without these balanced inhibitory interactions, the 
growth of horizontal connections during development could proliferate uncontrollably if 
inhibition is too weak, or could be suppressed entirely if inhibition is too strong (Grossberg and 
Williamson, 2001). 
A Synthesis of 3D Vision, Attention, and Grouping 
Our discussion so far has not considered how the brain sees the world in depth. Since the original 
LAMINART breakthrough in the mid-1990s, the model has been consistently extended into the 
3D LAMINART model of 3D vision and figure-ground perception. This step was achieved by 
unifying two previous models: the LAMINART model, which had until that time focused on 
cortical development, learning, grouping, and attention, but did not consider binocular 
interactions and 3D vision; and the non-laminar FACADE model of 3D vision and figure-ground 
perception (Grossberg, 1994, 1997; Grossberg and McLoughlin, 1997; Kelly and Grossberg, 
2000; McLoughlin and Grossberg, 1998). The resulting unification was able to build upon 
LAMINART without having to discard any of its mechanisms, and to achieve a much broader 
explanatory and predictive range. Through this synthesis, the 3D LAMINART model has 
clarified how the laminar circuits of cortical areas V1, V2, and V4 are organized for purposes of 
stereopsis, 3D surface perception, and 3D figure-ground perception (Cao and Grossberg, 2005; 
Fang and Grossberg, 2005; Grossberg and Howe, 2003; Grossberg and Swaminathan, 2004; 
Grossberg and Yazdanbakhsh, 2005). As a result, the 3D LAMINART model predicts how 
cellular and network mechanisms of 3D vision and figure-ground perception are linked to 
mechanisms of development, learning, grouping, and attention. The following discussion merely 
hints at how this generalization builds seamlessly upon the already available LAMINART 
foundation. The original articles should be consulted for data support and model explanations 
and simulations of 3D vision data. 
Figure 7 
In the 3D LAMINART model, layer 4 no longer directly activates layer 2/3, as in Figure 2c. 
Instead, layer 4 monocular simple cells first activate layer 3B binocular simple cells, which in 
turn activate layer 2/3A binocular complex cells, as shown in Figure 7. The layer 2/3A cells can 
then interact via horizontal interactions, like those summarized in Figures 2c and 2e, to enhance 
cell activations due to approximately co-oriented and co-linear inputs. Second, binocular 
complex cells in layer 2/3A can represent different disparities, and thus different relative depths 
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from an observer. Interactions between layer 2/3A cells that represent the same relative depth 
from the observer can be used to complete boundaries between object contours that lie at that 
depth.  
Because binocular fusion begins already in layer 3B, the binocular boundaries that are 
formed in layers 3B and 2/3A may be positionally displaced, or shifted, relative to their 
monocular input signals from layers 6 and 4. Figure 2c illustrates that these layer 2/3 boundaries 
feed signals back to layer 6 in order to select the winning groupings that are formed in layer 2/3, 
but issues about binocular shifts did not need to be considered in data explanations of the original 
LAMINART model. How can the positionally displaced binocular boundaries in layer 2/3A of 
Figure 6 contact the correct monocularly activated cells in layers 6 and 4, so that they can 
complete the feedback loop between layers 2/3A-6-4-3B-2/3A that can select winning 3D 
groupings? Signals from the monocular layer 4 cells activate positionally-shifted binocular cells 
in layer 3B, which in turn activate layer 2/3A binocular complex cells. This raises the question: 
How can such positionally displayed layer 2/3A cells activate the correct layer 6 monocular cell 
sources? 
 The 3D LAMINART model proposes that horizontal connections, which are known to 
occur in layers 5 and 6 (Callaway and Wiser, 1996), accomplish this. Feedback signals from 
layer 2/3A propagate vertically to layer 5, whose cells activate horizontal axons in this layer that 
contact the appropriate layer 6 cells. These layer 5-to-6 horizontal contacts are assumed to be 
selectively formed during development. Grossberg and Williamson (2001) and Grossberg and 
Seitz (2003) have simulated how layer 2/3 connections and layer 6-to-4 connections may be 
formed during development. The selective layer 5-to-6 contacts are proposed to form according 
to similar laws. In summary, inward horizontal layer 4-to-3B and 2/3A-to-2/3A connections are 
proposed to form binocular cells and their groupings, while outward layer 5-to-6 connections are 
proposed to close the feedback loops that help to select the correct 3D groupings.  
Given how 3D groupings in layer 2/3A contact the correct layer 6 cells, the preattentive-
attentive interface problem forces a proposal for how attention fits into the 3D circuit: namely, 
top-down attentional outputs from layer 6 of a higher cortical level like V2 activates the same 
layer 5 cells that contact monocular input sources in layer 6 via horizontal connections. Then the 
layer 6-to-4 modulatory on-center, off-surround network controls attentional priming and 
matching, just like in Figure 2b. This proposal raises the question of how the top-down pathways 
from layer 6 of a higher cortical level know how to converge on the same layer 5 cells to which 
the layer 2/3 cells project at the lower cortical level? Since firing of the layer 2/3 cells activates 
the layer 5 cells as well as the layer 6 cells of the higher cortical level, this may occur due to 
associative learning.  
Grossberg and Versace (2005, 2006) have proposed an elaboration of the LAMINART 
model, called the Synchronous Matching Adaptive Resonance Theory (SMART) model, in 
which such learning processes are studied down to the level of individual spikes and dendrites. 
This model extends laminar cortical modeling in a different direction by investigating how 
synchronization of neuronal spiking occurs within and across multiple brain regions, including 
how neocortical areas interact with higher-order specific and non-specific thalamic nuclei, and 
how synchronization abets synaptic plasticity using spike-timing-dependent-plasticity. The 
SMART extension of LAMINART also proposes a functional explanation for the differential 
expression of oscillation frequencies, notably gamma and beta, during match (gamma) or 
mismatch (beta) between bottom-up thalamic input and top-down cortical expectations, and of 
aggregate cell recordings such as current-source densities and local field potentials. The main 
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fact for our present review is that a rational extension of LAMINART can bridge between all the 
processing levels that join individual spikes to cognitive information processing, and that 
SMART can quantitatively simulate, and functionally rationalize, data on all these organizational 
levels as part of an unified system architecture. 
Habituation, Development, Reset, and Bistability 
In addition to fast mechanisms of activation and slower mechanisms of learning, another 
intermediate time scale is needed to control cortical dynamics; notably, activity-dependent 
habituative mechanisms, as was noted above in the discussion of attentional shrouds. In 
particular, habituation of chemical transmitter gates has proved to be essential in studies of 
cortical development (Grunewald and Grossberg, 1998; Olson and Grossberg, 1998; Grossberg 
and Seitz, 2003); see Grossberg (2003b) for a review. The habituative mechanisms prevent the 
developmental process from “getting stuck” into activating, over and over, the cells that initially 
win the competition. Such perseveration would prevent multiple feature combinations from 
getting represented in a distributed fashion throughout the network. Habituative interactions help 
to solve this problem because habituation is activity-dependent: only those cells or connections 
habituate that are in active use. Thus, when habituation acts, it selectively weakens the 
competitive advantage of the initial winners, so that other cells can become activated to represent 
different input features.  
 Habituative mechanisms play an important role in adult vision by helping to reset 
previously active visual representations when the scenes or images that induced them change or 
disappear. Without such an active reset process, visual representations could easily persist for a 
long time due to the hysteresis that could otherwise occur in circuits with as many feedback 
loops as those in Figures 2 and 7. In many examples of this reset process, offset of a previously 
active input leads to an antagonistic rebound of activation of previously inactive cells, and these 
newly activated cells help to inhibit the previously active cells, including grouping cells in layer 
2/3. This reset process is not perfect, however, and there are large perceptual databases 
concerning residual effects of previously active representations. In fact, such a reset process has 
elsewhere been used to explain psychophysical data about visual aftereffects (Francis and 
Grossberg, 1996; Grunewald and Lankheet, 1996), visual persistence (Francis et al., 1994), and 
binocular rivalry (Arrington, 1993, 1995, 1996; Grossberg, 1987; Liang and Chow, 2002), 
among other data that are all proposed to be manifestations of the reset process. Ringach et al. 
(1999) have reported direct neurophysiological evidence for rebound phenomena using reverse 
correlation techniques to analyze orientational tuning in neurons of cortical area V1. Abbott et al. 
(1997) have provided direct experimental evidence in visual cortex of the habituative 
mechanisms that were predicted to cause the reset (Grossberg, 1968, 1969, 1980). Grossberg 
(1980, 1999b) also predicted that such reset processes play a role in driving the reset and 
memory search processes that help the adult brain to rapidly discover and learn new 
representations of the world, as part of Adaptive Resonance Theory.  
The same habituative mechanisms that usually phasically reset active brain 
representations can also lead to persistent multi-stable percepts when two or more 3D 
interpretations of a 2D image are approximately equally salient, as in Necker cube percepts, and 
also during binocular rivalry. For example, Grossberg and Swaminathan (2004) used habituative 
and competitive mechanisms to simulate development of disparity-gradient cell receptive fields 
and how a 2D Necker cube image generates bi-stable 3D boundary and surface representations.  
 In summary, there is a predicted link, mediated by habituative transmitter mechanisms, 
between processes of cortical development in the infant and processes of perceptual and 
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cognitive reset, learning, and bistability in the adult. This link is worthy of a lot more 
experimental study than it has received to date. 
Towards a Unified Theory of Laminar Neocortex: From Vision to Cognition 
The results above focus on vision, which is a spatial process, or more accurately, a SPATIO-
temporal process. Can LAMINART principles be used to explain data about the temporal 
dynamics of cognitive information processing, which involves more spatio-TEMPORAL 
processes? In particular, how do the layered circuits of prefrontal and motor cortex carry out 
working memory storage, sequence learning, and voluntary sequential performance? A neural 
model called LIST PARSE (Grossberg and Pearson, 2005, 2006) has begun to explain and 
quantitatively simulate cognitive data about immediate serial recall and free recall, including 
bowing of the serial position performance curves, error-type distributions, temporal limitations 
upon recall accuracy, and list length effects. The model also qualitatively explains cognitive 
effects related to attention, temporal grouping, variable presentation rates, phonemic similarity, 
presentation of non-words, word frequency/item familiarity and list strength, distracters and 
modality effects. In addition, the model quantitatively simulates neurophysiological data from 
the macaque prefrontal cortex obtained during sequential sensory-motor imitation and planned 
performance demonstrating parallel coding of movements in a sequence with relative activation 
predictive of performance order. 
The LIST PARSE model proposes functional roles for the different layers of granular 
lateral prefrontal cortex, notably ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, for storage of temporal lists of 
events in working memory and learning of list categories. LIST PARSE hereby illustrates how 
variations on granular laminar cortical circuits can quantitatively simulate data about SPATIO-
temporal processes in vision as well as spatio-TEMPORAL data about cognition. 
LIST PARSE proposes how to embody an Item and Order working memory model, also 
called a Competitive Queuing working memory model, into the laminar circuits of ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex. Competitive Queuing models were introduced in Grossberg (1978) and have 
gradually become the dominant model for how to temporarily store sequences of events in 
working memory. Competitive Queuing models were derived from an analysis of how to store 
sequences of speech or motor items in working memory in a manner that can be stably coded in 
long-term memory (e.g., word, language, and skill learning) without destabilizing previously 
learned list categories that are subcategories of the new ones being learned; e.g., how to learn 
MYSELF when you already know MY, SELF, and ELF. The main design principle is called the 
LTM Invariance Principle. An exciting consequence of the LTM Invariance Principle is that 
primacy (correct order), recency (backwards order), and bowing (a mixture) effects emerge from 
it. Bowing means that the system is not able to reproduce the correct order from working 
memory if the list of stored items becomes too long. Thus the inability to read-out correct order 
information of long lists from working memory can be traced to the need for stable learning.  
LAMINART now allows us to analyze on a deep mechanistic level brain processes that 
seem to be totally unrelated on the level of day-to-day language. As just one example, 
LAMINART predicts that the volitional mechanism which allows humans to experience visual 
imagery and fantasy is the same mechanism, suitably specialized, that controls the storage of 
event sequences in working memory. It remains to be seen whether and how such LAMINART 
mechanisms are specialized within the laminar circuits of other cortical areas to realize a variety 
of intelligent behaviors.  
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Figure 1. Some visual processes and their anatomical substates that are being modeled as part of 
a unified vision system. LGN = Lateral Geniculate Nucleus; V1 = striate visual cortex; V2, V4, 
MT, MST = prestriate visual cortex; IT = inferotemporal cortex; PPC = posterior parietal cortex; 
PFC = prefrontal cortex. 
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Figure 2. How known cortical connections join the layer 6 ? 4 and layer 2/3 circuits to form an 
entire V1/V2 laminar model. Inhibitory interneurons are shown filled-in black. (a) The LGN 
provides bottom-up activation to layer 4 via two routes. First, it makes a strong connection 
directly into layer 4. Second, LGN axons send collaterals into layer 6, and thereby also activate 
layer 4 via the 6 ? 4 on-center off-surround path. The combined effect of the bottom-up LGN 
pathways is to stimulate layer 4 via an on-center off-surround, which provides divisive contrast 
normalization (Grossberg, 1973, 1980; Heeger, 1992) of layer 4 cell responses. (b) Folded 
feedback carries attentional signals from higher cortex into layer 4 of V1, via the modulatory 6 
? 4 path. Corticocortical feedback axons tend preferentially to originate in layer 6 of the higher 
area and to terminate in layer 1 of the lower cortex (Salin and Bullier, 1995, p.110), where they 
can excite the apical dendrites of layer 5 pyramidal cells whose axons send collaterals into layer 
6. The triangle in the figure represents such a layer 5 pyramidal cell. Several other routes through 
which feedback can pass into V1 layer 6 exist (see Raizada and Grossberg (2001) for a review). 
Having arrived in layer 6, the feedback is then “folded” back up into the feedforward stream by 
passing through the 6 ? 4 on-center off-surround path (Bullier et al., 1996). (c) Connecting the 
6 ? 4 on-center off-surround to the layer 2/3 grouping circuit: like-oriented layer 4 simple cells 
with opposite contrast polarities compete (not shown) before generating half-wave rectified 
outputs that converge onto layer 2/3 complex cells in the column above them. Just like 
attentional signals from higher cortex, as shown in (b), groupings that form within layer 2/3 also 
send activation into the folded feedback path, to enhance their own positions in layer 4 beneath 
them via the 6 ? 4 on-center, and to suppress input to other groupings via the 6 ? 4 off-
surround. There exist direct layer 2/3 ? 6 connections in macaque V1, as well as indirect routes 
via layer 5. (d) Top-down corticogeniculate feedback from V1 layer 6 to LGN also has an on-
center off-surround anatomy, similar to the 6 ? 4 path. The on-center feedback selectively 
enhances LGN cells that are consistent with the activation that they cause (Sillito et al., 1994), 
and the off-surround contributes to length-sensitive (endstopped) responses that facilitate 
grouping perpendicular to line ends. (e) The entire V1/V2 circuit: V2 repeats the laminar pattern 
of V1 circuitry, but at a larger spatial scale. In particular, the horizontal layer 2/3 connections 
have a longer range in V2, allowing above-threshold perceptual groupings between more widely 
spaced inducing stimuli to form (Amir, Harel, & Malach, 1993). V1 layer 2/3 projects up to V2 
layers 6 and 4, just as LGN projects to layers 6 an 4 of V1. Higher cortical areas send feedback 
into V2 which ultimately reaches layer 6, just as V2 feedback acts on layer 6 of V1 (Sandell & 
Schiller, 1982). Feedback paths from higher cortical areas straight into V1 (not shown) can 
complement and enhance feedback from V2 into V1. Top-down attention can also modulate 
layer 2/3 pyramidal cells directly by activating both the pyramidal cells and inhibitory 
interneurons in that layer. The inhibition tends to balance the excitation, leading to a modulatory 
effect. These top-down attentional pathways tend to synapse in layer 1, as shown in Figure 2b. 
Their synapses on apical dendrites in layer 1 are not shown, for simplicity. (Reprinted with 
permission from Raizada and Grossberg (2001).) 
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Figure 3. The effect of attention on competition between visual stimuli. A target stimulus, 
presented on its own (a), elicits strong neural activity at the recorded cell. When a second, 
distractor stimulus is presented nearby (b), it competes against the target, and activity is reduced. 
Directing spatial attention to the location of the target stimulus (c), protects the target from this 
competition, and restores neural activity to the levels elicited by the target on its own. The 
stimuli shown here, based on those used in the neurophysiological experiments of Reynolds et al. 
(1999), were presented to the model neural network. Spatial attention (c), was implemented as a 
Gaussian of activity fed back into layer 6. (d) Neurophysiological data from macaque V2 that 
illustrate the recorded activity patterns described above: strong responses to an isolated target 
(dotted line), weaker responses when a competing distractor is placed nearby (dashed line) and 
restored levels of activity when the target is attended (solid line). (Adapted with permission from 
Reynolds et al. (1999, Fig. 5).) (See also Reynolds, J., Nicholas, J., Chelazzi, L. & Desimone, R. 
(1995). Spatial attention protects macaque V2 and V4 cells from the influence of non-attended 
stimuli. Society for Neuroscience Abstracts, 21, 693.1). (e) Model simulation of the Reynolds et 
al. data. The time-courses illustrated show the activity of a vertically oriented cell stimulated by 
the target bar. If only the horizontal distractor bar were presented on its own, this cell would 
respond very weakly. If both target and distractor were presented, but with the horizontal 
distractor attended, the cell would respond, but more weakly than the illustrated case where the 
distractor and target are presented together, with neither attended. (Reprinted with permission 
from Grossberg and Raizada (2000).) 
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Figure 4. Spread of visual attention along an object boundary grouping, from an experiment by 
Roelfsema et al. (1998). (a) The experimental paradigm. Macaque monkeys performed a curve-
tracing task, during which physiological recordings were made in V1. A fixation spot was 
presented for 300 ms, followed by a target curve and a distractor curve presented simultaneously. 
The target was connected at one end to the fixation point. While maintaining fixation, the 
monkeys had to trace the target curve, then, after 600 ms, make a saccade to its endpoint. (b) 
Neurophysiological data showing attentional enhancement of the firing of a neuron when its 
receptive field (RF) lay on the target curve, as opposed to the distractor. Note that the 
enhancement occurs about 200 ms after the initial burst of activity. Further studies have 
indicated that the enhancement starts later in distal curve segments, far from the fixation point, 
than it does in proximal segments, closer to fixation (Pieter Roelfsema, personal 
communication). This suggests that attentional signals propagate along the length of the target 
curve. (Figures (a) and (b) adapted with permission from Roelfsema et al. (1998).) (c) Model 
simulation of the Roelfsema et al. data. (Reprinted with permission from Grossberg and Raizada 
(2000).) 
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Figure 5. Contrast-dependent perceptual grouping in primary visual cortex. (a) Illustrative visual 
stimuli. A variable-contrast oriented Gabor patch stimulates the classical receptive field (CRF), 
with collinear flanking Gabors of fixed high-contrast outside of the CRF. The stimulus shown 
here, based on those used Polat et al. (1998), was presented to the model neural network. (b) 
Neural responses recorded from cat V1. The colinear flankers have a net facilitatory effect on 
weak targets which are close to the contrast-threshold of the cell, but they act to suppress 
responses to stronger, above-threshold targets. When the flankers are presented on their own, 
with no target present, the neural response stays at baseline levels. (Reproduced with permission 
from Polat et al. (1998).) (c) Model simulation of the Polat et al. data. (Reprinted with 
permission from Grossberg and Raizada (2000).) 
a b cNeurophysiological data Model simulation 
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Figure 6. Schematic of the boundary grouping circuit in layer 2/3. Pyramidal cells with colinear, 
co-oriented receptive fields (shown as ovals) excite each other via long-range horizontal axons 
(Bosking et al., 1997; Schmidt et al., 1997), which also give rise to short-range, di-synaptic 
inhibition via pools of interneurons, shown filled-in black (McGuire et al., 1991). This balance 
of excitation and inhibition helps to implement the bipole property. (a) Illustration of how 
horizontal input coming in from just one side is insufficient to cause above-threshold excitation 
in a pyramidal cell (henceforth referred to as the target) whose receptive field does not itself 
receive any bottom-up input. The inducing stimulus (e.g. a Kanizsa ‘pacman’) excites the 
oriented receptive fields of layer 2/3 cells, which send out long-range horizontal excitation onto 
the target pyramidal. This excitation brings with it a commensurate amount of disynaptic 
inhibition. This balance of “one-against-one” prevents the target pyramidal cell from being 
excited above-threshold. The boundary representation of the solitary pacman inducer produces 
only weak, sub-threshold colinear extensions (thin dashed lines). (b) When two colinearly 
aligned inducer stimuli are present, one on each side of the target pyramidal cell receptive field, a 
boundary grouping can form. Long-range excitatory inputs fall onto the cell from both sides, and 
summate. However, these inputs fall onto a shared pool of inhibitory interneurons, which, as well 
as inhibiting the target pyramidal, also inhibit each other (Tamas, Somogyi, & Buhl, 1998), thus 
normalizing the total amount of inhibition emanating from the interneuron pool, without any 
individual interneuron saturating. The combination of summating excitation and normalizing 
inhibition together create a case of “two-against-one”, and the target pyramidal is excited above-
threshold. This process occurs along the whole boundary grouping, which thereby becomes 
represented by a line of suprathreshold-activated layer 2/3 cells (thick dotted line). Boundary 
strength scales in a graded analog manner with the strength of the inducing signals. (Reprinted 
with permission from Grossberg and Raizada (2000).) 
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Figure 7. Model circuit diagram. The full 3D LAMINART model consists of a boundary stream 
that includes V1 interblobs, V2 pale stripes, and part of V4, and computes 3D perceptual 
groupings that are predicted to be amodal, or perceptually invisible, within this stream; and a 
surface stream that includes V1 blobs, V2 thin stripes, and part of V4, and computes 3D surfaces 
that are infused with visible color and lightness in depth. These two streams both receive 
illuminant-discounted signals from Retina/LGN cells, and interact with each other to overcome 
their complementary deficiencies to create consistent 3D boundary and surface percepts in 
cortical area V4. Also, 3D boundary and surface representations formed in the pale stripes and 
thin stripes of cortical area V2, respectively, are amodally completed, and provide neural support 
for the object recognition process in inferotemporal cortex. See Cao and Grossberg (2005) for 
additional discussion. 
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